

schematism of Kant [1781].

Notes to Conclusion.

1. Nagel, 1979 p.xii.
2. Rorty, 1980, 1982.
3. 1986.
4. Fine, 1986 p.173.
5. Rorty, 1982 p.xiv.
6. Rorty, 1982 p.xiv.
7. Aristotle, I take it, more or less started the 'conversation' about matters relevant to force.
8. This point is, of course, essentially the same as the "time limit" argument which Feyerabend [1970 p.215] brings against Lakatos [1970]. It has always seemed to me that Feyerabend's point here is devastating.
9. 1975.
10. It is particularly clear how this "lingualism" leads to a very extreme form of relativism in the work of Goodman [1978], who holds that all forms of representation, even paintings, represent in a distinctly language-like way [Goodman, 1976]. On the other hand, if we follow Davidson [1973] in rejecting the idea of a multiplicity of conceptual schemes, then "lingualism" leads to a sort of "linguistic phenomenalism, a new version of Berkeley" [Passmore, 1985 pp.164]. (Passmore does not approve of this.)
11. I have particularly in mind the efforts of the Sloan Foundation in promoting and funding 'Cognitive Science'.
12. 1983.
13. 1983.
14. 1979 chap.1 §3.
15. There are exceptions to this, however. See, e.g. the work of Roe [e.g. 1951], Taylor & Barron [1963], Hudson [1966], Maslow [1966], and the pieces collected by Tweney, Doherty & Mynatt [1981].
16. Examples of works which associate relativism with sociological study of science would be: Barnes [1974], Bloor [1976], Latour & Woolgar [1979], and Collins & Pinch

[1982]. This list could be considerably extended.

17. As some, for example Latour & Woolgar [1979], seem to think.