

real directed thought, but then, this may very well be the case.

Notes to §II.D.6.

1. Paivio, 1971, 1986.
2. E.g. Paivio, 1977 p.51.
3. See Paivio, 1986 chap.2.
4. §I.C.2.
5. See §I.C.5 above.
6. Neisser, 1976a p.147.
7. Kosslyn, 1976a. But this work originally appeared as experiment 6 of his doctoral thesis [Kosslyn, 1974].
8. Kosslyn, 1974 p.78; 1976a p.249. In fact, examination of his graphs shows that the second group, the ones not given time to form an image actually tended to be somewhat faster in finding the feature than the ones who were supposed to already have formed it.
9. Kosslyn, 1976a p.294; 1974 pp.78-9, 100-101.
10. I made an attempt to replicate this result, with the assistance of Mr. G. Smith, whilst I was attached to the psychology department at the University of California, Davis. Unfortunately I have lost contact with Mr. Smith, who had retained the experimental results for analysis. I hope to be able to repeat the experiment, with a somewhat improved technique, fairly soon.
11. 1978 p.82.
12. Morris & Hampson, 1983 p.139.
13. Yarbus, 1967.
14. See, e.g. Kosslyn, Pinker, Smith & Shwartz, 1979b p.573.
15. Neisser, 1976a pp.148-9.
16. See Gibson, 1979 pp.121-6.
17. 1981, 1984a.
18. Neisser, 1978b p.173.
19. See Pylyshyn [1979a], Yuille & Steiger [1982]

and Yuille [1983] on rotation, and Richman, Mitchell & Reznick [1979a,b] and Mitchell & Richman [1980] on scanning.

20. 1984; Freyd, 1983; Finke & Freyd, 1985.

21. Cherry, 1966 pp.279-82.

22. 1976a chap.5.

23. Except that he takes it that we are always ready to pick up certain attention grabbing phenomena such as "loud noises, rhythmic repetitions of stimuli, sudden visible movements, and painful stimuli" [Neisser, 1976a p.94].

24. Neisser & Becklen, 1975; Spelke, Hirst & Neisser, 1976; Littman & Becklen, 1976; Neisser, 1979; Bahrick, Walker & Neisser, 1981; Goldstein & Fink, 1981; Becklen & Cervone, 1983.

25. 1986.

26. 1978. Neisser [1976a p.32n.11] acknowledges that Hochberg's views are very close to his own.

27. See Wurtz, Goldberg & Robinson, 1982.

28. Warrington & Taylor, 1973, 1978.

29. 1978.

30. Bisiach & Luzzatti, 1978.

31. Bisiach, Luzzatti & Perani, 1979.

32. Bisiach, Luzzatti & Perani, 1979 p.614.
Emphasis in original.

33. Bisiach, Luzzatti & Perani, 1979 p.615.

34. In fact the term "schema" is used in a whole lot of quite different ways by different people in psychology and the allied sciences. In fact it has become a byword for ambiguity and vagueness [see, e.g. Miller, Polson & Kintsch, 1984 p.6]. But we need not concern ourselves with all of these different usages. The two which we are now considering are quite enough to be going on with.

35. Head & Holmes, 1911 p.187. Bisiach, Luzzatti & Perani, 1979 p.609.

36. Neisser, 1976a p.54; c.f. Neisser, 1967 p.10. Bartlett [1932 pp.199-201] explicitly draws the term from Head. Bisiach, Luzzatti & Perani [1979 p.609] trace the term before Head, to the 19th century German physiologist Wernicke, and no doubt it derives ultimately from the

schematism of Kant [1781].

Notes to Conclusion.

1. Nagel, 1979 p.xii.
2. Rorty, 1980, 1982.
3. 1986.
4. Fine, 1986 p.173.
5. Rorty, 1982 p.xiv.
6. Rorty, 1982 p.xiv.
7. Aristotle, I take it, more or less started the 'conversation' about matters relevant to force.
8. This point is, of course, essentially the same as the "time limit" argument which Feyerabend [1970 p.215] brings against Lakatos [1970]. It has always seemed to me that Feyerabend's point here is devastating.
9. 1975.
10. It is particularly clear how this "lingualism" leads to a very extreme form of relativism in the work of Goodman [1978], who holds that all forms of representation, even paintings, represent in a distinctly language-like way [Goodman, 1976]. On the other hand, if we follow Davidson [1973] in rejecting the idea of a multiplicity of conceptual schemes, then "lingualism" leads to a sort of "linguistic phenomenalism, a new version of Berkeley" [Passmore, 1985 pp.164]. (Passmore does not approve of this.)
11. I have particularly in mind the efforts of the Sloan Foundation in promoting and funding 'Cognitive Science'.
12. 1983.
13. 1983.
14. 1979 chap.1 §3.
15. There are exceptions to this, however. See, e.g. the work of Roe [e.g. 1951], Taylor & Barron [1963], Hudson [1966], Maslow [1966], and the pieces collected by Tweney, Doherty & Mynatt [1981].
16. Examples of works which associate relativism with sociological study of science would be: Barnes [1974], Bloor [1976], Latour & Woolgar [1979], and Collins & Pinch