

Crassini's later study [1984] is designed to meet Finke's criticisms, and still finds no imagery induced McCollough effect.

56. 1980; Kaufman, May & Kunen, 1981.

57. Marks, 1983a pp.103-4.

58. Marks, 1983a p.104.

#### Notes to §II.C.5.

1. C.f. Dilman, 1967 p.36.

2. See §II.A.3 above.

3. See §I.A.I.

4. See §II.A.3 above.

5. Kant, 1781 (trans. p.183).

6. A mental picture, as Berkeley [1734 introduction §12] pointed out, could be assigned to stand for a universal (a "general idea"). However, this would require that we already have a grasp of the universal.

7. In his recent popularization of his views Kosslyn directly acknowledges the force of Berkeley's argument [Kosslyn, 1983 p.6], although he later makes a halfhearted and unpersuasive suggestion as to how it might be overcome [Kosslyn, 1983 p.207]. But Kosslyn is not really concerned with epistemology, and in his more serious work he can, and does, sidestep the relevant questions [Kosslyn, 1980 p.116].

8. Fodor, 1975 p.191.

9. Olson & Bialystok, 1983 p.26.

10. Olson & Bialystok, 1983 p.x.

11. Fodor, 1980.

12. See Fodor, 1978a p.521.

13. Fodor, 1978b pp.246-7.

14. E.g. Fodor, 1981a p.31; 1985 p.99.

15. See, e.g., P.M. Churchland, 1979; P.S. Churchland, 1980.

16. Fodor, 1980.

17. Lindsay & Norman, 1977 pp.390-391.

18. Anderson & Bower, 1973 pp.449ff..

19. Anderson & Bower, 1973 p.154.

20. See Anderson & Bower, 1973 chap.2.

21. Anderson & Bower, 1973 pp.154-5.

22. 1974.

23. Kintsch, 1974 p.10.

24. Kintsch, 1974 p.10.

25. Fodor, 1981a p.213. Fodor is not in fact commenting here on the work of Kintsch or Anderson & Bower, but on his interpretation of work in "procedural semantics" by people like Winograd [1972] and Miller & Johnson-Laird [1976]. Johnson-Laird [1978] protests that Fodor has seriously misunderstood this work and is quite wrong to interpret it as sensationalistic [for reply see Fodor, 1979]. However, even if Fodor's remarks do not apply to his intended targets they seem still to be appropriate to ours.

26. See Reid, 1823 chap.V §§ V and VI (original edition 1764). In fact, of course, it had been in large part already established by Berkeley and by Hume. However, they still accepted the sensationistic premise and were thus led, respectively, to idealism and to scepticism. Reid remained a realist and thus rejected the view that perception is grounded in sensation. In a way Reid could even be seen as doing no more than replaying the arguments of Plato, Aristotle and the Sophists about the limitations of the material senses [see §I.A.1 above]. Reid, of course, is playing Aristotle's part to Berkeley's Plato and Hume's Protagoras. It is notable that he calls his system a philisopy of "common sense". Although it generally seems appropriate to take this soubriquet in its modern, colloquial meaning, I wonder if Reid did not also have the Aristotelian *sensus communis* in mind when he appropriated the phrase.

27. 1977 p.390.

28. 1974 p.10.

29. Hamlyn, 1961 p.125.

30. E.g. 1960 p.16.

31. It may be that Quine's "Ontological Relativity" [Quine, 1969] is not quite the same as relativism (although the distinction is a nice one), but Quine's influence seems to have been the decisive factor in pushing many other philosophers, at least in America, into relativism proper [Coffa, 1982].

32. Palmer, 1978 pp.266-7. Palmer refers us to Tarski's theory of models for more formal explication of what he has in mind.

33. Hofstadter, 1979 pp.49ff.,82.

34. Hofstadter, 1979 pp.53-4.

35. Wittgenstein, 1960.

36. Wittgenstein, 1961.

37. 1981.

38. Heil represents his paper as a critique of the views of Fodor [1975]. However, Fodor does not seem to hold an 'isomorphism' theory of reference. Indeed, as we have seen, he freely admits that he has no idea how to solve the problem [Fodor, 1981a p.31]. Heil's discussion, however, remains relevant to those like Palmer and Hofstadter who do seem to hold such a theory.

39. An exception may be at the level of the elementary particles of physics, as Hofstadter [1979 pp.53-4] mentions. However, even if there are any truly elementary particles, which remains an open question, we do not normally know how things are structured at this level, and we certainly do not need to know this in order to refer to ordinary, macroscopic objects and events.

40. Heil, 1981 p.337.

41. Heil, 1981 p.339.

42. 1981 p.340.

43. C.f. Heil, 1981 p.341.

44. Haugeland, 1984 p.96. Haugeland is in fact unsure whether such an account will work, be he argues that it is implicit in the theories of A.I. and Cognitive Science.

45. Haugeland, 1984 pp.96-7.

46. Forgetting, for the moment, Gödel's theorem.

47. Hofstadter, 1979 p.54.

48. Quine, 1969 p.59; Pylyshyn, 1984 p.44.

49. 1984 pp.44.

50. Pylyshyn, 1984 p.44.

51. 1983.

52. 1980.

53. 1978a - especially chapter 1.

54. At least, Searle seems to believe that a computer could be programmed to converse sensibly (i.e. pass the Turing test) in Chinese, which surely goes a long way towards this end. But possibly he only concedes this for the sake of argument.

55. Stich, 1983. This is not actually the form of Stich's argument, but I think it captures his intentions.

56. 1980.

57. I do not think that all aspects of Searle's position are very reasonable. In particular, his view that the intentionality of our mental states depends necessarily on the biochemistry of the brain [Searle, 1980 p.424] seems quite absurd to me. I have no objection in principle to the notion that there might be a robot like Pylyshyn's with a brain which is a digital computer, made of silicon or whatever you like. I just don't think that this computer's states should be identified with the robot's mental states (see below).

58. 1985.

59. I do not think there is much doubt that a digital computer could, in principle at least, simulate the workings of a human brain. However, this does not mean that a computer (as opposed to a robot) could think, or, indeed, mentally represent, in the same sense that a person does. This is because brains do not think. People or animals, whole organisms with all their multifarious perceptual and effector organs, are what think. Thinking, I believe, is a part of that interaction with our environment which constitutes our lives, and it does not go on in isolation from this. Of course I do not deny that the brain is the organ which plays the most active, central and vital rôle in thinking, but then the legs play the most active, central and vital rôle in walking, yet we do not imagine that they could go strolling off on their own. Much of the rest of the body (including the brain) is needed. Why should the brain have an independence which the other organs lack?

#### Notes to §II.D.1.

1. 1983 p.132.

2. 1968.

3. 1976.