

psychologists who seem to hold it (but see Carr [1979]). It has been defended from charges of regressive homuncularism by Attneave [1961]. Morris & Hampson [1983] apply the conception more explicitly and self-consciously to a quasi-pictorial theory of imagery than does Kosslyn.

17. Shiffrin, 1973.

18. See Descartes, 1628 Rule XII.

19. 1979 p.9; c.f. Fodor, 1981a p.1.

20. 1982.

21. 1980 p.464.

22. That is, the so called "analog-propositional" dispute between 'quasi-pictorial' and 'descriptive' theorists during the 1970's. [My note.]

23. Kosslyn, Pinker, Smith & Shwartz, 1979b.

24. 1976. Neisser intends this diagram somewhat satirically. But despite the rather blatant placing of "consciousness" in the final box, I doubt if information processing theorists could find much to seriously object to in it. Similar, if more specific, diagrams, occur throughout the literature. For another generalized version, which shows "consciousness" here too (also meant a little humorously, but less critically), see Haber [1974].

25. Kosslyn, 1981 p.51.

26. See e.g. Kosslyn, 1981 pp.51-2.

27. 1977.

28. Many are much disputed 'findings, we should note.

29. E.g. Kosslyn & Shwartz, 1977; Kosslyn, Pinker, Smith & Shwartz, 1979a; Kosslyn, 1980, 1983.

30. Kosslyn & Shwartz, 1977 p.276.

31. Kosslyn, 1985; Kosslyn, Holtzman, Farah & Gazzaniga, 1985; Farah, 1984.

Notes to §II.B.2.

1. See part I above. Also Engell, 1981; Warnock, 1976; Strawson, 1970.

2. Ryle, 1949 p.235.

3. Very similar points could also be made about materialist versions of 'true' pictorialism.

4. Morris & Hampson [1983 pp.37-8] seem to indicate a reply to Ryle along these sorts of lines. It is consistent with Kosslyn's views about images of complex objects being constructed out of images of sub-parts.

5. Flew, 1953 p.253; Lawrie, 1970 p.253.

6. Coss, 1969; Schatzman, 1980

7. See Hebb, 1968 p.476.

8. To follow up our alternative suggestion: would the background behind where the lips had been look distorted? The answer would seem to be the same.

9. Flew, 1953.

10. 1958.

11. Flew, 1979 p.152.

12. 1958 chap. Iixi - esp. pp.207e,213e. He also says that an image is not a picture [1958 §301.], but he neglects to tell us what it is. His famous argument, in the opening pages of *The Blue Book* [Wittgenstein, 1960], for the irrelevance of imagery to meaning, seems to me to depend on the assumption that imagery is after all pictorial.

13. Budd, 1987 pp.1-2.

14. Coleridge, 1817 p.167.

15. Engell, 1981.

16. Robson, 1985; Warnock, 1976; Paivio, 1983b; Engell, 1981.

17. See e.g. Shepard, 1978a,b; Walkup, 1965; Gordon, 1972; Tweney, Doherty & Mynatt, 1981 pt.VIII; Koestler, 1969; Paivio, 1983b; Miller, 1984; Van't Hoff, 1878; Roe, 1951; Ziman, 1981 p.13; Curtin, 1982 (esp. pp.134-5); Ghiselin, 1952 (e.g. pp.43, 85, 67, 63).

18. The situation here is by no means clear. There are considerable methodological problems, and the putative relationship between imagery and general creative ability may not be straightforward, but see: Schmeidler, 1965; Hargreaves & Bolton [1972]; Khatena [1976]; Lindauer [1977]; Shaw & Belmore [1982]; Kunzendorf [1982]; Forisha [1983]; and Shaw, [1985].

19. See Holt, 1964.