

51. 450a; Hamlyn, 1968a p.195.

52. De Anima 428a,b.

Notes to §I.A.2.

1. De Anima 428a 1.

2. E.g. Ryle, 1949 pp.242-4; Flew, 1953; Gross, 1973; Dix, 1985.

3. Dix, 1985 pp.3-5.

4. E.g. Strawson, 1971; Warnock, 1976; Furlong, 1961.

5. Dix, 1985 p.43.

6. Flew, 1953.

7. 1961 chap.3.

8. It seems to me quite easy to guess how this might have happened. Certainly many instances of supposing or mistakenly thinking do involve concomitant imagery (as both Dix [1985] and Gross [1973] would admit), but there will generally be little or no evidence whether this is happening or not when others are doing the supposing. Thus third person uses of "imagine" might often have been 'incorrect' (i.e. there was no imagery being experienced), from which it is very likely that we would soon have learned to freely use the term, even in the first person, for these imageless supposals - even, indeed, in cases where there could not be images.

9. 1985.

10. 1985 chap.1.1a.

11. And which, to be fair, I get the impression he too would reject when made explicit.

12. 1973.

13. Dix, 1985 p.35.

14. The view to be taken here is that "imagination" implies the capacity to experience mental imagery in all these cases. I do not say that actual experienced images need occur in any of them.

15. 1971.

16. 1978.

17. The word "phantasia" seems not to occur in any Greek writings before the middle dialogues of Plato [Rees, 1971 p.503n7]. Juhasz nevertheless attempts to trace earlier related ideas. Plato has little to say about **phantasia**, but he clearly considers **phantasmata** as leading us away from, rather than towards, true knowledge [Republic 598b; Sophist 236b,c]. This view of imagination has also, of course, persisted, and may have had particular currency when the modern conception of science was being fabricated. Pascal inveighs most heavily against the imagination "that mistress of error and falsehood (...) which seems to have been given to us on purpose to lead us into necessary error" [1670 §81]; and both Bacon and Descartes also warn against it [Roszak, 1972 pp.287-8]. But note that Aristotle too allowed that "imagination may be", or even is "for the most part", "false" [De Anima 428a].

18. Yates, 1966; Hamlyn, 1961.

19. Yates, 1966; Engell, 1981 p.254.

20. Its intentionality in the sense of its rôle in the motivation and planning of behaviour by providing a surrogate object of desire or aversion in the absence of the actual object [Aristotle, De Anima 431a,b]. Albertus Magnus refers to this specifically in terms of the **intentiones** contained in images [Yates, 1966 p.64]. The contemporary philosophical use of "intentionality", of course, derives from such Scholastic usages through Brentano.

21. 1973.

22. Descartes, 1664 - trans. p.86f - see §II.A.3 below.

23. Beare, 1906 p.294-5.

24. Concerning Body - 1656 chap.XXV §7.

25. Leviathan - 1651 chap.2.

26. That is, he says, because the Latinate terms strictly apply only to the visual, where an actual image is formed (on the retina), as opposed to "Fancy; which signifies **appareance** [sic] and is as proper to one sense, as to another" [1651 p.88]. Hobbes, of course, wrote much of his work, including the original of **Concerning Body** [1656] in Latin, and sadly it is his use of the misleading Latinate term which has persisted. "Fancy" and "imagination" were seemingly once synonyms in English, but through the 18th century a distinction came to be made, with "fancy" coming to designate the unreliable, banal, and merely mechanically associative aspects of the faculty, and with "imagination" more and more acquiring connotations of creativity and poetic inspiration [Engell, 1981 esp. chap.13]. This process culminated with Coleridge [1817].

Nowadays "fancy" seems to have almost died out as the name of a mental faculty. "Fantasy" has presumably had a related history.

27. See Engell, 1981; Warnock, 1976.

28. 1971 p.494.

29. Coleridge, 1817 chap.V.

30. 1846 pp.286-8.

31. 1981 pp.260-1.

### Notes to SI.B.1.

1. It might be objected here that to go to empirical science in order to assess and develop views about the nature and possibility of empirical knowledge is to argue in a circle. However, so long as our purpose is not to try ground empirical science on unshakeable foundations this circularity need not be vicious. On the contrary, it is my fond hope that as we consider the psychological and epistemological issues in close interaction each will throw some fresh light on the other. The epistemology being done here is "naturalized" epistemology as recommended by Quine [1969 chap.3]. Although some of my conclusions, both psychological and epistemological, will be at variance with his, like Quine I do not hope to show that empirical knowledge can be made certain. Nor did Aristotle, as his remarks on the unreliability of imagination/sensus communis attest [De Anima 428a,b; De Sensu 442b].

2. See e.g. Schultz, 1981 pp.56-7.

3. Hume, 1739; Kant, 1781. See Strawson, 1971; Warnock, 1976.

4. Engell [1981] is a detailed, but rather impressionistic and uncritical, recounting of that development.

5. E.g. Shelley, 1821.

6. Coleridge, 1817 (p.167).

7. Haber, 1970. Essentially similar accounts are given by: Holt [1964], A. Richardson [1969 p.ix], Paivio [1971 chap.1], Sheehan [1972 - Preface], Kosslyn [1980 chap.11], J.T.E. Richardson [1980 chap.2], Morris & Hampson [1983 chap.1 SI] and Bugelski [1984], amongst others.

8. Wundt, in Watson [1979 p.128] - original German, 1873.