

- 64. 1976a, 1978a.
- 65. 1966, 1967, 1979.
- 66. See Anderson [1978, 1979]; Palmer [1978].

Notes to §I.A.1.

- 1. Beare, 1906 pp. 213-15.
- 2. 184-186. All references to and quotes from Plato's works, unless otherwise indicated, are based on the translations collected in Hamilton & Cairns [1963].
- 3. *Theatatus* 185c.
- 4. 185c.
- 5. Plato, *Theatatus* 186e-187a.
- 6. Plato, *Theatatus* 184e.
- 7. Beare, 1906 p.215.
- 8. *De Anima* 428a. All references to and quotes from Aristotle's works, unless otherwise indicated, are based on the Oxford collected edition of translations edited by Ross & Smith [1955].
- 9. *De Anima* 427b (my emphasis).
- 10. *De Anima* 418a.
- 11. The Scholastics' Latin phrase is often used, and helps to avoid confusion with the quite different meaning of "common sense" in modern idiomatic English. The transliterated Greek is "koine misthesis".
- 12. The translation of "phantasia" as "imagination" is, of course, open to question. But it has recently been defended by Schofield [1978].
- 13. Sometimes translated by Beare as "presentations" - or we might today like "representations". And Lycos [1964] prefers "appearances". But the more usual "images" and "imagination", as we shall see in §I.A.2 and §II.A.2 are thoroughly appropriate renderings.
- 14. *De Somniis* 459a.
- 15. See Nussbaum, 1978 pp.234-5.
- 16. See Kosman, 1975; Hamlyn, 1968a.
- 17. E.g. Allan, 1970 p.52.

18. E.g. Ando 1965 pp.123-5; Beare 1906 p.296.

19. Ross [1923 p.142-3] is unhappy about the passages in which Aristotle apparently assigns such a large rôle in perception to *phantasia*, because the same functions seem elsewhere to be attributed to sense (*aisthesis*), itself. But if we do not regard *phantasia*/"common sense" as a separate faculty from the individual senses, but rather, after the manner of Kosman [1975 - see below], as the form of the overall perceptual system, of sensory function taken as a whole, then this would no longer seem a problem.

20. As Hamlyn [1968a p.195] points out, this is one of only three occurrences of this expression in the entire corpus. It must be seriously doubted whether Aristotle intended "common sense" to be the name of a faculty at all, let alone one different from the image forming faculty. (Of the other two occurrences that in *De Anima* [425a] relates only to perception of the common sensibles, but that in *De Partibus Animalium* [686a] links it to thought, for which images are said to be essential [see below].).

21. 450a.

22. *Phantasia* is the faculty of memory because the temporal, in particular pastness, falls under the "common sensibles" (see below) [*De Memoria et Reminiscentia* 450a] .

23. *De Somniis* 449a. Hett, 1935 p.xii.

24. See: Modrak, 1981 p.165; Yates, 1966 p.32; Butcher, 1902 p.126.

25. *De Anima* 431a (my emphasis).

26. *De Memoria et Reminiscentia* 449b 31.

27. *De Anima* 427b.

28. But it is worth noting that, according to Thayer [1975], Plato may have had the poet Simonides particularly in his mind in his famous attacks on poetry, and Simonides was renowned as the inventor and advocate of the use of imagery for mnemonic purposes [Yates, 1966]. It would seem to have been largely the knowledge of these striking mnemonic effects that has maintained an interest in imagery over the centuries [Yates, 1966] and has largely led to the recent revival of interest [Bugelski, 1977]. Plato's objection to poetry is that in describing the world of sense - and even worse, describing *phantasmata*, mere copies of it - poetry leads us away from knowledge of true reality [*Republic* 958b; *Sophist* 236b,c]. It looks as if the disagreement about imagination is closely bound up with the disagreement about empirical knowledge.

29. *De Anima* 425a. There are other, condensed versions of this list [e.g. *De Anima* 418a; *De Sensu et*

Sensibili 437a]. Also in **De Sensu et Sensibili** [442b] he mentions "Roughness and Smoothness, and (...) Sharpness and Bluntness" in this connection; but these, of course, are aspects of 'figure'. It seems fairly clear that what he has in mind are what we would call 'spatio-temporal' properties.

30. 425b-427a; also **De Somno et Vigilia** 455a.

31. And which can thereby very well be construed as being Aristotle's faculty of consciousness [Modrak, 1981; Natsoulas, 1983 pp.438-9; Beare, 1906 p.288].

32. 1866 bk.II pt.III §11.

33. 1906 p.289.

34. **De Anima** 425b.

35. 1968a.

36. 1975.

37. **De Anima** 427a.

38. **De Somno et Vigilia** 455a - the same faculty is also held responsible for our wakefulness and sleeping.

39. **Theatetus** 185c.

40. 1700 Bk.II chap.8 §9. Locke just adds "solidity" to the list.

41. This is not the same thing as the Idealism of Berkeley or Hegel, of course. It is a downgrading rather than a denial of the material world, and, in stark contrast to Berkeley, a devaluation of the empirical.

42. 1968a.

43. Hamlyn, 1968a p.204.

44. It would, though, still be highly arguable that the tradition which places a high epistemological value on imagination stems from a very widespread, and perhaps very happy, misinterpretation of The Philosopher.

45. 1981 p.163.

46. **De Somno et Vigilia** 455a.

47. **De Anima** 425a.

48. Hamlyn, 1968b p.118.

49. 1975.

50. 1968a.

51. 450a; Hamlyn, 1968a p.195.

52. De Anima 428a,b.

Notes to §I.A.2.

1. De Anima 428a 1.

2. E.g. Ryle, 1949 pp.242-4; Flew, 1953; Gross, 1973; Dix, 1985.

3. Dix, 1985 pp.3-5.

4. E.g. Strawson, 1971; Warnock, 1976; Furlong, 1961.

5. Dix, 1985 p.43.

6. Flew, 1953.

7. 1961 chap.3.

8. It seems to me quite easy to guess how this might have happened. Certainly many instances of supposing or mistakenly thinking do involve concomitant imagery (as both Dix [1985] and Gross [1973] would admit), but there will generally be little or no evidence whether this is happening or not when others are doing the supposing. Thus third person uses of "imagine" might often have been 'incorrect' (i.e. there was no imagery being experienced), from which it is very likely that we would soon have learned to freely use the term, even in the first person, for these imageless supposals - even, indeed, in cases where there could not be images.

9. 1985.

10. 1985 chap.1.1a.

11. And which, to be fair, I get the impression he too would reject when made explicit.

12. 1973.

13. Dix, 1985 p.35.

14. The view to be taken here is that "imagination" implies the capacity to experience mental imagery in all these cases. I do not say that actual experienced images need occur in any of them.

15. 1971.

16. 1978.